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Abstract
This article assesses the innovation policy objectives underlying the proposed European Union
(EU) Telecom Single Market regulation considering disruptive technological developments. The
article explores the network operator’s dilemma how to deal with investments in a time where
fundamental innovation comes from outside and the regulator’s dilemma how to improve the
conditions for access to the operators’ networks and how to safeguard a level playing field. The EU
measures with respect to two technological issues are discussed considering the EU’s policy
objectives with respect to the deployment of 5G and the goal to ensure very high-speed broadband
access in the EU. Thought is given to the effectiveness of imposing active and passive infrastructure
arrangements. A mix of regulatory measures is considered in moving towards smarter electronic
communications networks regulation.
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Introduction
The expected take-off of new services, such as Internet of Things (IoT) and Machine to Machine
(M2M) communications, and the coming allocation of 5G frequencies are likely to increase the
demand for mobile data transmission and broadband services (Ecorys, TNO, TU Delft, 2011;
McKinsey Global Institute, 2013). The technological possibilities offered by new and improved
underlying infrastructure support almost unlimited transmission capacity on optical fibre networks.
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These developments will result in a deeper convergence of mobile and fixed networks. A spectrum
plan is a key pillar of the Digital Single Market (DSM) initiative. The European Union’s (EU)
Telecoms Single Market (TSM) regulation is aimed at coordinating spectrum licensing and bring-
ing seamless service provision to end-users, wherever they are and no matter what terminal
equipment they use. At the same time, the on-going transition from traditional telecommunications
systems to all-IP packet switched data grids will challenge the electronic communications net-
works (ECNs) operators’ business models further. The operators must upgrade or replace their
existing networks to cater for the implementation of 5G frequencies. This requires heavy infra-
structure investments (Alexiades, & Shortall, 2016; TSM Proposal, 2016, p. 1).1 The advent of
software-defined networks (SDNs) and network function virtualization (NFV) could bring inno-
vative opportunities for network operators. NFV and SDN may be the key to achieving better
network and services interoperability and to breathing new life into networks – albeit at uncertain
costs and unknown profit-sharing revenue (Gijrath, 2018).2 Meanwhile, competition between the
operators of ECNs and new entrants with disruptive service offerings (often referred to as over the
top players (OTTs)) will intensify. Infrastructure capacity sharing and enhanced security will be at
the centre of discussion in contract negotiations. The new entrants desire no, or at most light,
regulation to ensure a level playing field. The operators prefer to stick to the existing regulation.
This period of transition comes with a host of regulatory challenges. These challenges range from
coordination measures to specific topics such as creating incentives for ECN operators; from
safeguarding the level playing field to regulating OTTs; and from detailed considerations, such
as infrastructure-sharing obligations to institutional measures for regulatory authorities.
Based on a literature overview, this article explores which mix of regulatory measures could be
employed to stimulate innovation and safeguard interoperability in the European electronic com-
munications sector in the next years of transition. Two sub-questions are whether (1) the Com-
mission makes a case for incentive regulation that will stimulate innovation and whether (2)
deregulation in the transition period could be effective. In section ‘Shifting regulatory perspec-
tives?’, shifting regulatory perspectives will be addressed. Subsequently, the TSM Proposal and
the conflicting interests of market players will be explored briefly (section ‘The recast Telecoms
Single Market proposal’). ‘Which regulatory tools are effective?’ section explores which regula-
tory tools may be effective. ‘Cost-oriented regulation’ section discusses cost-oriented price regu-
lation. ‘Yardstick regulation, state aid – or some profit sharing?’ section explores yardstick
regulation. It also discusses the impact of subsidies, and H20203 is discussed in the context of
stimulating innovation and the prohibition on state aid. ‘Deregulation’ section assesses the option
of deregulation. In section ‘Redefining converging network levels for services interoperability’, a
look is had at whether interoperability levels could be regulated differently considering network
convergence. When contemplating regulatory models, it must be considered that contracts at the
wholesale level remain a practical form of self-regulation. Private law is an open system of judicial
standards that is more suitable than telecommunications regulation to shape technological
1. Recast Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council Establishing the European Electronic
Communications Code, COM(2016) 590 final, 2016/0288 (COD), Brussels 14.9.2016.
2. Software-defined network (SDN) and network function virtualization (NFV) will be discussed below. In short, SDN
enables access of third parties to network control functions, whereas these third parties continue to control their own
physical and virtual core network elements. NFV enables that certain network functionality can be translated into
software, which can run on cheaper, generic, hardware.
3. Horizon (2020, 2017), ‘Work Programme 2018-2020’, unauthorized version (H2020).
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innovation. ‘Market regulation and smarter contracts’ section discusses whether parties can reach
effective agreements even where there is market regulation. The institutional aspects of the next
round of EU telecommunications network regulation will be discussed briefly in section ‘Institu-
tional aspects’. The final section gives the conclusion. An important question in this article is how
legislative proposals driven by rapidly involving technological developments affect contracts that
are subjected to market regulation (Gijrath & Smits, 2007, p. 53). How should technological
developments be translated in balanced and enforceable contract provisions? Another way to
approach telecommunications networks is to ask whether there is ground for the regulation for
innovation (rather than regulation of innovativeness; Butenko & Larouche, 2015)? The ideas
offered in this article are meant to be high-level, and this article attempts providing a forward-
looking view to regulation of technological developments.
The regulatory landscape: The EU, operators and OTTs
Prior to the analysis of elements in the TSM Proposal that are relevant to telecommunications
networks, the shifting in regulatory perspectives will be discussed.
Shifting regulatory perspectives?
The emphasis of regulation often lies on intervening in or the prevention of harmful situations
(Mooij, 2014, pp. 3–4; OECD, 2002). Put simply, regulation is aimed predominantly at restricting
anti-competitive behaviour. For parties outside the EU, the regulatory choices made are sometimes
difficult to follow. This may be partly due to the distinction made in the EU between anti-trust and
ex ante regulation. The investigations against companies like Facebook, Google and Qualcomm
expose the dominance of US companies in global digital markets. The EU Commission has
expressed concern about access to these services and fears that innovation will be stifled, and
market parties are pushing the Commission to intervene (Soros, 2018). Conversely, the TSM focus
is on ex ante regulation designed to prevent the occurrence of undesirable activity – in the telecoms
sector, activities to create barriers for entry and predatory pricing. Regulatory intervention occurs
predominantly at the wholesale level. A host of obligations may be imposed on a party that is
considered to have significant market power (SMP). These obligations relate to safeguarding
access to infrastructure of the SMP party and transparency and non-discrimination for the SMP
party’s competitors with respect to technical and pricing information. When new players cause
market disruption, the system of ex ante intervention is not automatically coming into play. Only
once the Commission and the national regulatory authorities (NRAs) have reassessed the relevant
market, could symmetric rather than asymmetric measures be imposed. EU ex ante market regu-
lation relies heavily on the imposition of price measures for access services. Roughly, the Eur-
opean rules consist of two possible ways of imposing these (Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 2012, p.
461). The first way is cost-oriented pricing. Cost-oriented pricing may be subjected to many
different models to determine the calculation method. The underlying thinking is to evaluate what
would be the cost for a new entrant to build an alternative network to be able to supply similar
services (Hauge & Sappington, 2010). Cost-oriented price regulation may thus incentivize cost
reduction measures and replacement investments by the ECN operators. Yet, often there is con-
tention among the market parties on the models’ different outcomes. Besides, where the focus is on
stimulating innovation, it remains to be seen whether innovation can be an element of price
regulation. There is a second way of intervening that has a link with innovation: The NRA can
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also impose a more generic obligation on ECN operators to charge ‘reasonable’ prices (Baldwin
et al., 2012, p. 462).
The recast TSM Proposal
The TSM Proposal was one of core initiatives of the EU’s DSM strategy, which houses a broad
range of regulatory initiatives from the free flow of data to cross-border parcel deliveries.4
Undoubtedly, the Commission will have weighed its regulatory options carefully. Indeed, the
coming regulatory period requires a ‘careful weighting of the factors that are influenced by the
industry specific features, firm behavior and regulatory incentives’ (Gruber & Koutroumpis,
2012, p. 2; Hauge & Sappington, 2010). But the DSM strategy is all-encompassing. The regu-
lation to improve the TSM falls under the somewhat poetic initiative to create ‘( . . . ) the right
conditions for digital networks and services to flourish’. It attempted to strike a balance in the
interests of ECN operators, electronic communications service providers, OTTs and end-users
(Amendola, Gassot, Lebourges, & Stumpf, 2014). One of the legislative aims was to simplify the
existing regulatory framework, by bringing seven EU directives together in one electronic
communications code.5 The 5G action plan aimed, predominantly, at coordinating mobile spec-
trum licensing.6 The EU Commission planned to combine the repeal of parts of the New Reg-
ulatory Framework (NRF) with the introduction of new directed cluster regulation. The TSM
Proposal went through several phases; the first proposal dates from November 2013. The recast
proposal was issued in September 2016.7 The TSM regulation focuses more than its predecessor,
the draft Connected Continent Regulation on promoting innovation. In addition to achieving
better access to very high-speed broadband networks and the most advanced spectrum, including
their roll-out, the Commission was looking for a way to mirror financial instruments – for
instance, the amounts that parties who are interested in obtaining spectrum must pay – with the
requirement for all stakeholders to be more innovative:
to ensure optimal use of resources, fees should reflect the economic and technical situation of the
market concerned as well as any other significant factor determining their value. At the same time, fees
should be set in a manner that enables innovation in the provision of networks and services as well as
competition in the market. [ . . . ].8
The Commission defined two broader policy goals: first, the improvement of conditions for access
to financial sources for research and innovation purposes and second, the assurance that innovative
ideas could be turned into products and services that create growth and jobs.9 I will look at the
TSM regulation from the perspective of infrastructure competition, meaning that I am focusing
more on regulation for innovativeness, rather than on regulation of innovation (Bennet Moses,
2013; Larouche & De Streel, 2016). The starting point is that commercial innovation will push the
4. European Parliament (2017).
5. REFIT (2013).
6. In 2017, an internal institutional battle between the European Union’s Council and the Commission resulted in a victory
for the Commission (CJEU, 2017).
7. After this article was finalized (March 2018), a political agreement was reached after a trilogue in the Council on 6 June
2018, see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4070_en.htm.
8. TSM Proposal (2016), consideration 26.
9. Commission Communication (2010).
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demand of services over very high-speed broadband networks10; increased competition at the local
level as a result of the activation of smaller frequency cells, will enable more intricate networks11;
the existing instruments for EU spectrum policy have been improved12; and ‘wholesale only
models are likely to feature more prominently in ex ante market analysis.13 The Commission’s
institutional approach is to continue letting NRAs in the EU member states apply the (new) rules.
EU funding is available to support the rollout of cross-border networks. The H2020 initiative plans
to fund smart and sustainable growth. H2020 puts its emphasis on stimulating research and
‘innovation activities’, including on telecommunications issues (Granieri & Renda, 2012; Com-
mission, 2018).
At the institutional level, the Commission bestowed the execution of policy goals more on the
NRAs. To achieve that, Article 3, second section, of the TSM Proposal emphasized four tasks for
the NRA: (i) the – existing task of – the stimulation of competition in the electronic communica-
tions markets should be focused more on the stimulation of efficient competition at the infra-
structure level; (ii) the stimulation of access to and take-up of very high-speed broadband networks
by all EU citizens and companies; (iii) the contribution of the further development of the internal
market through the removal of the remaining obstacles and the creation of convergent conditions
for the investment in and the delivery of ECNs, associated facilities and services; which goal
should be achieved through the development of common regulations and predictable regulatory
methods. This would serve the effective, efficient and coordinated use of spectrum, open innova-
tion, the establishment and development of trans-European networks, the availability of interoper-
ability of pan-European services and end-to-end connectivity; and (iv) the assurance that EU
citizens would take up the widespread high fixed and mobile capacity and the underlying Elec-
tronic Communications Services (ECS), and realization of the maximal advantages in terms of
choice, price and quality. The tasks of the NRAs about access and interconnection also contained a
very general obligation for the NRAs to consider technological innovation when considering
imposing obligations on parties providing or authorized to provide ECN.14
The electronic communications sector is atypical as it is subject to specific technological
characteristics that pose recurring significant investment issues. Where the Commission expressed
its keenness on steering towards more convergence between fixed and mobile infrastructure, it
must be observed that impact of regulation on fixed ECN operators is rather different from the
impact on mobile ECN operators. Fixed ECN operators continue to be subject to stronger reg-
ulatory scrutiny than mobile operators. Unlike the case for regulating fixed networks, ex ante
market regulation of mobile ECN operators is less likely to occur. This is due to the circumstance
that (most) mobile players are not considered to have SMP (a past exception being the market for
mobile terminating tariffs). However, national governments are likely to attempt generating or
imposing very substantial fees on the mobile operators who acquire new frequency licenses.
Whereas mobile ECN providers operate under a fixed term frequency licence, once an ECN or
cable operator has obtained a registration or licence to operate in the EU, there is no predetermined
end date or life span for exploitation of such registration/licence. The fixed operator’s adminis-
trative fee is significantly lower than the price of a frequency lot – and the differences between
10. REFIT (2013). Impact Assessment, part 1/3, p. 19.
11. Impact Assessment, part 1/3, p. 24.
12. Impact Assessment, part 1/3, p. 101.
14. The third para. new, sub (f) of Article 59.
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NRA administration fees depend on the same factors (turn-over). Besides, special conditions are
imposed hardly ever on fixed operators at the issue of the registration/licence. The fixed license
term entails that mobile ECN operators need to replace or modify their mobile radio access
network (RAN) equipment every time they acquire a license to use a new generation of frequen-
cies. It should also be kept in mind that, contrary to the procedures used for registering fixed
operators or permitting them to enter the market, the government agency that allocates the fre-
quency licence has the option to attach special conditions to the exploitation of the frequency
licence (see below). Since the emphasis on asymmetric regulation for fixed ECN operators is likely
to decrease over the coming years, the Commission was looking for another way to steer the
innovation it desires so much:
In services, competition between local providers of electronic communications services that bundle
network access with services and global providers of services over the top of the networks reinforces
the right of the EU to act to ensure a level playing field.15
A more lenient approach taking into account the rise of innovative services competition at the retail
level could lead to symmetric regulation. Indeed, differently balanced market regulation was a
major policy concern:
[ . . . ] Disruptive innovations, while very convenient and financially beneficial to end users, bring the
need to analyse their impact on existing competition conditions and possible distortive effects stem-
ming from differentiated regulatory treatment, as well as the adequacy of existing regulation in a
changed environment.16
The ECN operators will exhibit economies of scale. These will persist over a wide range of output
caused by their customers’ needs. However, more and more their business models are challenged
by OTTs. There is also tension between the gatekeepers’ capacity to innovate incrementally, and
the game changers’ ability to innovate more fundamentally (Cave, 2006). Investments made in the
ECNs may be lost because of having to adapt to these technological advances that keep coming
from the outside. The ECN operators also need to facilitate the processing of growing data streams,
enabled by innovative applications developed and marketed by the OTTs. But possible additional
income because of increased data processing, does not, necessarily, yield sufficient revenue to
stimulate the ECN operators to invest substantially in infrastructure innovation. This then leads to a
risk of lumpiness of investments by the operators (Vogelsang, 2012, p. 1). The sunk costs resulting
from such investments imply risks associated with the real options the operator has (Vogelsang,
2012, pp. 11–19ff.).17 The operator’s dilemma is how to strike the balance between network
capacity shortages and excess capacity and how to avoid unnecessary duplicate investments.
Moreover, it is difficult for ECN operators to predict the long-term durability of their investments,
where regulatory intervention could result in price regulation, thus making their investments less
tenable.18
15. TSM Proposal (2016), p. 15.
16. Impact Assessment Part 1/3, p. 28 second last section.
17. Many of the economic aspects discussed in this article emanate from Vogelsang (2012). I am indebted to his clear
views on how economic aspects can influence a regulator’s choices in terms of dealing with technological change.
18. The Dutch incumbent faced an investment dilemma in 2009, when it had to decide when and how to substitute its
copper infrastructure with optical fibre. As it was implementing the necessary changes, it became subject to strict
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On the material side, the supplementary documents to the TSM Proposal showed that the
Commission struggled in dealing with innovation that comes from within (incumbents) or from
outside OTT players. One of the regulator’s dilemma is that the costs made to maintain and update
the gate keeper’s network are relatively transparent. But the costs made for fundamental innovation
are not. The ECN operator has information regarding technical specifications at its disposal, which
may put it at a competitive advantage. It has a menu of choice on how to configure its network. It
may have a head start where it can weigh the different risks and, thus, different outcomes it may
expect. Asymmetry of information between the regulator and the incumbent operators is a pre-
vailing problem. Hence, probably, the regulatory focus on incumbents rather than OTTs. Whether
a fixed or mobile ECN operator is subject to market regulation or not, it must decide on investing in
infrastructure to ensure its networks adapt flexibly to customer demand. Especially, the highly
important investments in next-generation network (NGN) should be subject to scrutiny, as the cost
will be difficult to plan, and the level of intervention is unknown to the operator (Arve & Zwart,
2014). Hence, the question how smart regulation can be achieved and with what regulatory tools
(Gunningham & Grabosky, 1998).
Which regulatory tools are effective?
At the basic level, the available toolkit leaves the following options (TNO, Ecorys, IVIR 2015): (i)
the repeal (parts of) the NRF; or, conversely; (ii) the enhanced application, re-interpretation and/or
stricter enforcement of the NRF; or (iii) the imposition of renewed and directed regulatory instru-
ments. Where and how networks are connected impacts the effectiveness of communications traffic
and its cost (Ecorys, TNO, TU Delft. 2011, p. 10). Hence, where pan-European telecommunications
networks gain in prominence, a closer look must be had at regulation as a tool for innovation.
Vogelsang (2012) ranks four types of regulatory initiatives that could be imposed on regulated
ECN operators based in the risks and incentives they provide for the operators:
 Rate-of-return regulation combined with other cost-plus types of regulation – which is the
lowest risk and incentive, in his view;
 Profit sharing – which is a medium risk and incentive;
 Cost-oriented regulation – it is not mentioned whether he considers this form in conjunction
with access specific regulation – carries medium to high risk and incentives;
 Yardstick/benchmarking – which is considered to carry the highest risk and, conversely, the
strongest incentives, possibly.
This section focuses on cost-orientation (section ‘Cost-oriented regulation’ ) and yardstick regu-
lation (section ‘Yardstick regulation, state aid – or some profit sharing?’) and addresses profit
sharing and rate-of-return. It will also discuss whether deregulation or reliance on self-regulation in
the telecommunications sector could be a viable option.
To cater for the possible side-effects of overuse of yardstick regulation, it is important for the
regulator to consider whether it is feasible and sustainable to leave the societal interest of having
scrutiny by the national regulatory authority (NRA). As part of its ex ante market analysis, the NRA was investigating
whether and to what extent it would impose proportionate measures on the incumbent, such as obligations as to grant
non-discrimination, transparency, cost-efficiency and access to certain network elements. The mere fact that the NRA
was intervening led to a more careful and conservative approach to investment in fibre.
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safe, secure, end-to-end, continuous electronic communications traffic (clearly: at reasonable end-
user prices) to the ECN operators (and ECS providers) who control the end-to end connections
only. This choice poses societal rather than pure economic questions (Bennet Moses, 2013;
Butenko & Larouche, 2015). It begs the question whether the policy goal of stimulating innovation
fits within the current mould of EU electronic communications’ policy objectives set forth in
Article 8 Framework Directive. In addition to the enhancement of competition, these are the
development of the internal market and the enhancement of end-users’ interests in terms of price
and quality. In principle (Baker, 2007), innovation of ECN and ECS and services interoperability
will thrive through competition. In the past decade, there has been a marked shift from network to
services interoperability: in short, allowing different kinds of applications to collaborate seam-
lessly, no matter over what networks they are transmitted. This change must lead to the regulator
reconsidering what are the most effective tools for regulation, bearing in mind that the current
framework for electronic communications focuses on rules to enhance network rather than services
interoperability; and that EU regulation may have a global impact. Any chosen mix of regulatory
tools is likely to have profound effects on investment (Guthrie, 2006), which is ultimately neces-
sary to enable end-users to adopt innovations (Gruber & Koutroumpis, 2012).
Cost-oriented regulation
Economic analysis is not unanimous on whether price regulation functions as a lever or a barrier to
invest (Baldwin et al., 2012, p. 7ff). Some authors identify neutral or even positive effects from
price regulation, but the analysis is focused on retail markets (Banerjee, 2003, pp. 243–249). Come
what may, ECN operators who are subject to cost-orientation will make different choices as how-to
time, spread and use investments considering regulation. They must consider if and how their
investments may be impacted – whether positively or adversely – by existing and future regulation.
Regarding the second way of imposing price regulation – the more open-ended requirement to
charge reasonable access prices to competitors – an important question for the regulator is whether
and how long the operators should be allowed to keep the resulting higher profits (Borrmann &
Brunekreeft, 2009). In the coming regulatory period, this may be justified, for instance, where the
operator has demonstrably introduced innovative elements into its network infrastructure that may
be of interest to competing, non-regulated operators and service providers. In this case, it would be
acceptable for the operator to include a mark-up for the innovative investments made. The eco-
nomic imperfection is that the real performance of the operator may not (yet) be in line with what
would come out of a benchmarking process as ‘best practice’. This then creates a gap in terms of
efficiency (Borrmann & Brunekreeft, 2009).
Clearly, the effectiveness of ‘reasonable’ price regulation needs to be explored further, espe-
cially since the test of whether prices charged by ECN operators to market parties who want access
to their networks, is likely to be tested ex post. Benchmarking – which is associated often with
yardstick regulation, may be necessary. The complexity of the current technological developments
also appears to point at the differences between the regulatory initiatives (Vogelsang, 2012)
becoming more fluid. Because prices are often set after the investments have been made, the
desire to enforce lower prices thus creates an ex post conflict with the ex ante desire to stimulate
innovative investments (Brito, Pereira, & Vareda, 2008; Gijrath, 2014; Granieri & Renda, 2012).
Dissent has been expressed by several parties, notably, the incumbents. Some authors consider
the current EU framework a ‘regulatory distortion of competition’, which inhibits investments
(Allouët, Le Franc, Marques, & Rossi, 2014; Bock, Wilms, Soos, & Roeber, 2014b, pp. 17–35;
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Boston Consulting Group, 2012). They point out that regulatory distortion has three consequences:
(i) the inability of ECN operators to make a fair return, which return – according to the authors – is
needed to fund further network investments. This inability to be profitable is made worse by an
uneven level playing field with the entry on the market of game changers: the OTTs who mostly
come from outside the EU and are not subject to any form of ex ante regulation (Bouygues I, 2009;
Bouygues II, 2013). According to these authors, asymmetric price regulation could well miss the
mark in achieving the goals of better end-user services; (ii) the mandated inefficiencies in the
mobile communications market. This is closely connected with the prices realized in the allocation
of spectrum, which are so high that – in their view – these costs may have a negative impact on the
speed of the 4G long-term evolution and 5G roll-out. This does not benefit end-users. Both
economists and the Commission argue that barriers to enter already fragmented mobile markets
are a problem too (Bock et al., 2014, pp. 24–25); and (iii) the lack of a harmonized EU approach,
according to them, is an issue as well. Here the authors seem to refer to different access conditions
across the EU. This last argument reads like a snake biting its tail; on the one hand, the authors
preach less regulation, on the other hand, they want more harmonization regulation, which seems
to be focused on equivalent market access conditions for ECN operators in the EU. The TSM
regulation contained some provisions on fulfilling fair and open access. As will be suggested
below, a point could be made for more harmonized contract measures. In the context of invest-
ments, the authors ask for a shift at the policy level from mere price regulation to measure that
reinvigorate investments (Bock et al., 2014, p. 27).
What about the role of the NRAs? Should they have an eye for the challenges that these
gatekeepers face from the game changers (Bock et al., 2014, p. 21)? According to some, the
answer should be positive. The justification for intervention is that the past measures to ensure
network capacity and better QoS have come at a significant cost to the ECN operators who tend to
become gatekeepers rather than service providers. To some extent, it is felt that the ECN operators
facilitate the provision of innovative services of the game changers, who do not have to make
network investments and are able to minimize cost of access with the help of the current regulatory
framework. Some even argue that the disruption caused by OTTs is the new imbalance that distorts
the level playing field (Allouët et al., 2014). They use this argument to support a solution of no
more price regulation – at least not in relation to services offered with the help of innovative
investments (Bock et al., 2014, p. 27). The gatekeepers must be allowed to ‘set different prices for
their services to develop innovative network management solutions so they can offer differentiated,
value-adding services, while maintaining a nondiscriminatory approach’ (Bock et al., 2014, p. 30).
Although the critics of price regulation do not really address the possibility of being made
subject to a ‘reasonable price’ rather than cost-oriented regulation, it can be inferred from their
arguments that their preference is for no more price regulation at all. The proponents of no
regulation argue that such absence would – by default – function as an incentive to free financial
means to innovate. In addition to a regulatory holiday, the EU could make available more special
funds to ECN operators to enhance or improve their network infrastructure fundamentally. An
example is the H2020 program.19 H2020 offers a host of subsidies to market parties in terms of
19. European Union subsidies by their nature do not fall under the state aid provisions of Articles 107–109 Treaty of the
functioning of the European Union (TFEU), simply because these provisions apply to the member states offering such aid,
and not to the Commission.
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network improvement (WP2018-2020). Whether this conflicts with the prohibition on state aid will
be discussed in section ‘Yardstick regulation, state aid – or some profit sharing?’.
Yardstick regulation, state aid – or some profit sharing?
It seems to make sense for ECN operators to become global frontrunners in terms of network
convergence in a future where IoT and M2M are to become part of daily life. This section discusses
briefly the investments in very high-speed broadband networks (also known as NGN) in the
context of yardstick regulation and the limits imposed by State Aid rules.
The Commission is determined to continue its support of ECN investments in NGN to pursue its
desire for sustainable job growth in the EU. Yardstick regulation can take many forms and is used
mostly in utility sectors (Mizutani, Kozumi, & Matsushima, 2009). The outcome is uncertain.
Measures in the telecommunications sector could run from subsidizing network innovation, to
removing spectrum caps, or financial payment schemes to support the market parties that acquire
5G licenses. An option for the NRA could be to make temporary compensatory adjustments
(Vogelsang, 2012, p. 19). There, we agree that ‘incentive-mitigating’, such as some form of
subsidy, or adjustments to the tightness of regulation – even for a limited period – could be
necessary and effective.
The Commission has launched various subsidies to support the roll-out and deployment of NGN
across the EU, especially where such would enhance interoperability of such networks. The basis
for this initiative can be traced back to H2020. The subsidization of very high-speed broadband
networks may be used by the Commission to promote and enhance the so desired IP connectivity of
the EU citizens and companies. However, funds are limited, and the success of subsidization is
uncertain. The actual execution is a matter of interested parties actively knowing and pursuing
announcements of financial aid. Subsidization may fit very well in the EU’s strategy, provided
that, whenever these are considered, the allocation must be transparent, sustainable and enforce-
able. The EU subsidies programs are not always that easy to access. It is not entirely clear from the
assessments what the results have been so far. Nor is there enough data to determine what subsidies
have been or will be effective.20 As it is difficult to determine whether the shift from ex ante to ex
post regulation includes incentivizing the parties with SMP (the gatekeepers) to be innovative, the
question is whether, and if so, to what extent, the gatekeepers should perhaps not also be able to tap
subsidies more. As pointed out before, there is a clear downside for the gatekeepers, when only the
OTTs are given access to or benefit from government innovation funds. Nevertheless, any form of
subsidizing will give rise to the question whether this distorts the level playing field.21
Even if the Commission succeeds in better coordination of frequency allocation procedures, the
actual deployment of 5G and broadband networks remains a matter of national law. H2020 appears
less focused on supporting 5G research. Rather, there is a steady flow of money towards parties
who investigate better security measures. Another area of material concern to the Commission is
the lack of access to networks in rural areas in the EU.22 The 2014 Regulation on the assessment of
state aid came at a convenient time.23 The Communications that accompany the 2014 Regulation24
20. EIN 2010; H2020 2017, Commission Communication (2014–2017).
21. Bouygues I; Bouygues II.
22. TSM Proposal (2016).
23. Commission Regulation (651/2014).
24. Handbook (2014).
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contain the conditions under which aid to parties wishing to roll-out very high-speed networks may
be justified.25 Moreover, the conditions for subsidies appear to have a geographical scope, that is,
national aid may be granted to ensure that EU citizens in rural areas will not be prevented from
access to NGN: these are called ‘white’ areas, as opposed to ‘black’ areas where NGN’s are active
– black areas state aid will not be permitted.26 However, the conditions formulated for aid also
contain circular reasoning and assessment. The money spent on research must bring significant
improvements in terms of network capacity, speed of communication and innovation. But the rules
provide little guidance on what would be the most reliable benchmark to assess actual results for
NGN improvements. This is a difficult hurdle for agencies granting subsidies. NGN-specific
subsidies could ring-fence the freedom of the recipient operators or construction firms to make
choices necessary in catering for the consequences of innovative technological changes to the
accompanying specifications of very high-speed broadband networks. It is a pity that the TSM
Proposal did not consider how subsidies for technological innovation in the electronic communi-
cations sector could be designed better.
The Commission mentions the use of financial instruments to promote innovation in consider-
ation 26 of the Proposal: ‘[ . . . ] [F]ees should be set in a manner that enables innovation in the
provision of networks and services as well as competition in the market. [ . . . ]’. It is not clear how
the Commission wants to achieve this. The Impact Analysis of the TSM Proposal lacks an in-depth
analysis on whether the investments that must be made by both the fixed and mobile ECN
operators in their infrastructure in the coming years include the cost of fundamental innovation,
that is, for the construction and roll-out of NGNs, or whether these are aimed at incremental
innovation, that is, for the maintenance and updating of network protocols and equipment
(Butenko, & Larouche, 2015). This makes it difficult to consider the actual legal impact of the
proposed regulation (REFIT, 2013). Yet the available literature suggests we are looking at fun-
damental innovation.
Lacking regulatory clarity, I agree with Vogelsang that it is up to the non-committed regulator
to consider the different forms of incentive regulation. Rather than relying on state aid, soft profit-
sharing regulation could include a more relaxed approach to what (excess) profits an ECN oper-
ator, who does invest heavily in fundamental innovation, could keep. According to Vogelsang, this
approach would still preserve the extent to which the regulated operator would remain a claimant
of residual profits. Conversely, more profit sharing could also reduce incentives to invest (Vogel-
sang, 2012). He also believes that asymmetric network sharing that favours the regulated operator
will not work. This is simply because the operator would be incentivized to overinvest, as there
would be a much lower risk in terms of ex post price regulation. In his analysis, cost-reducing
incentives should be deemed largely independent of the price-cap levels, so that investment
incentives would be safeguarded.
The choice for incentives also creates a governance issue (Marchant, Abbott, & Brown, 2013).
From an administrative law perspective, regulation must be non-discriminatory, precise and sus-
tainable. Incentive regulation to stimulate innovation is much more complicated to manage than ex
post market intervention to correct market failure. Incentive regulation could be built on erroneous
expectations. It will be difficult to create a meaningful governance framework for incentive
regulation (Marchant et al., 2013). It is difficult to see how the benefits for society that may come
25. Commission Communication (2014–2017) and Commission Recommendation (2013).
26. Commission Regulation (651/2014).
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from incentive regulation could surpass the benefits from innovation occurring in deregulated
markets.
Deregulation
When considering how and when to formulate subsidies, the question arises whether, rather than
through incentives, results can be achieved through a regulatory holiday. This juxtaposed approach
would relieve gatekeepers from further regulation during a defined period, while creating a shared
subsidies pool that aims not only at promoting fundamental innovation but also incremental
innovation. To get the benefits from this sort of regulatory holiday, ECN operators would have
to commit to significant infrastructure investments and be willing to report the scope of their
investments. They would have to account for the innovations; they would have to be transparent
regarding the scope of innovations.
Case law suggests that the Commission hinges more on relying the market investor principle:
less subsidization and less regulatory intervention for NGN deployment.27 Yet, deregulation does
not mean further liberalization of NGN per se; less intervention and more reliance on the market
investor principle should be supplemented by harmonization of NGN Quality of Service (QoS) in
the member states, otherwise the policy goals of establishing pan-European networks would be
moot. A shifting focus on harmonization and away from liberalization measures may be opportune
where markets as more open than in the past. Any approach begs the question whether the
Commission has the clout, the legitimacy and the tools to translate its policy goals in ‘soft’
incentive regulation.
The choice of the regulatory instrument creates timing issues. It is difficult for a regulator to
warrant that incentive regulation could serve to lengthen the regulatory commitment period nec-
essary for the successful grant and implementation of incentives. From an economic perspective
((Vogelsang, 2012), making such a commitment for the full-time horizon of infrastructure or
innovation investments is impossible for an ECN operator. The compatibility of incentive subsi-
dies that aim at stimulating efficient investments could become uncertain. It is exactly for this
reason that any form of incentive regulation for innovative network investments requires periodic
reviews and, possibly, interim modification.
Redefining converging network levels for services interoperability
Could innovation in the converging electronic communications sector be supported by a stronger
focus on dealing with interoperability issues? Could the threat of imposing access obligations on an
ECN operator with SMP function as a lever for incentive regulation? This section explores how
safeguarding interoperability may have a positive effect on innovation.
Interoperability is a collective notion for all measures that enable the end users of separate
networks or services to communicate with each other and to purchase services from providers other
than their own network provider. Network interoperability used to be defined as stimulus for
competition by linking up networks. Countless combinations of physical infrastructure are possible
(ABB, 2007; Gijrath, 2006). Where and how these networks are connected will impact the effec-
tiveness of communications traffic and its cost (ABB, 2014; Ecorys, TNO, TU Delft, 2011, p. 10).
27. CJEU (2016).
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Indeed, if interoperability is not achieved at the right level, then this may lead to undesirable
product homogeneity: Everything will start to look alike and the freedom of choice of users will be
limited. In that case, uniformity becomes an obstacle to innovation because it hinders diversity in
ICT applications.
The levels of network interoperability are likely to change if SDN and NFV take off (Gijrath,
2018). The goal of SDN is to enable cloud and network engineers to respond immediately to
changing business requirements and thus network specifications. SDN uses different network
technologies, which can make the infrastructure as such more agile. The core network (including
data) can be excluded from the infrastructure, making active sharing arrangements more attractive.
Consequently, with the transition towards IP being almost concluded, the notion of services
interoperability needs to be redefined. The traditional OSI model will no longer be leading.
In the coming period, interoperability requirements of service providers are likely to present
both mobile and fixed infrastructure access issues. Broadband access is a building block at the
wholesale level for providing internet access to end-users, so the mobile operators will face
interoperability issues with optical fibre providers. Imposing and enforcing detailed technological
interoperability standards is not an easy task. Meanwhile, the TSM Proposal showed the Commis-
sion’s keenness on stimulating mobile ECN providers to aim at establishing effective forms of
partnerships in sharing network elements, essential facilities and/or infrastructure. Examples range
from site-sharing agreements, to passive network sharing, to sharing of active network elements,
spectrum sharing or trading, national roaming or innovative MVNO constructions.28 It is just not
certain whether the Commission wanted to go beyond stimulating through enforcing a duty to
negotiate. The TSM Proposal contained more detail on mobile/fixed sharing than did the NRF.
By March 2018, it became clear that the 5G Action Plan was revived.29 In the proposal,
innovation as a policy goal of the allocation of 5G spectrum came to the fore. The member states
must describe their innovation goals in a clear manner in the allocation instrument; where possible,
the responsible minister must also calculate in advance the cost of such measures both at the
national and the EU.30 With this sub-clause, the Commission orders the member states to include
measures to promote innovation and business improvements. The power to include specific mea-
sures in the licensing process is left with the member states’ government agencies in charge of 5G
allocation. Since the NRAs are supposed to be independent agencies from the issuing ministry, the
question is why the Commission leaves the stimulation of innovation for mobile networks to the
national governments. Similarly, the reason is instrumental: Only a national government is com-
petent to issue specific regulations together with the rules for frequency allocation and subsequent
licenses.
Initially, the Commission wanted NRAs to impose a transnational requirement upon regulated
market parties to provide a European virtual broadband product. This is a form of access realized in
the form of a virtual link with the active layer in a fixed or wireless broadband network (Ecorys,
TNO, TU Delft, 2011, p. 88). The virtual broadband product would offer maximum network and
services interoperability. As usual, technological developments have overtaken slowly turning
28. There is a difference between active and passive network elements. Active elements: Base Transceiver Station (BTS),
microwave radio equipment, switches, certain antennae, transmitters/receivers; passive elements: masts, cabinets,
electricity, rights of way, cable ducts.
29. 5G Action Plan (2016).
30. TSM Proposal (2016), Articles 54, section 2, subsection (d).
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wheels of the legislative procedures. The draft from 2013 never made it for lack of political
support. But the TSM regulation was not an improvement. It wanted to limit the NRAs discretion
to assess the access requirements. The reason for this is a draft appendix that prescribed which
access levels could be imposed. This may seem justified from the perspective of the wish to
standardize very high-speed broadband access in Europe, but the complexity of the administrative
law procedures should have been investigated in greater detail beforehand. It is likely that NRAs
throughout the member states will interpret and apply the requirements differently. There must be
ample room for parties to contract the technical requirements. At the same time, the EU Council
focused on measures to reduce the cost of deploying high-speed ECN.31 Describing technological
requirements may prove to be risky; it is unlikely the appendices to the TSM Regulation will be
future proof – although they can be amended in a flexible manner.
Market regulation and smarter contracts
It is uncertain whether threats of regulation will bring competitors to agree a form sharing volun-
tarily. Although NRAs must consider technological innovation in market analysis, it is by no
means clear from the Impact Assessment how that will enhance innovation. Moreover, this
approach clashes with the market parties’ desire for deregulation.
Where there is a commercially feasible and equivalent alternative, the TMS Proposal provided
that the NRA should not impose access obligations in the context of infrastructure sharing.32
Conversely, the relevant section contained a concrete provision ordering the member states to
ensure that the NRAs are given the necessary powers to impose obligations to ECN providers
either: (i) with respect to the sharing of passive and/or active infrastructure; or (ii) to execute local
roaming agreements; or (iii) to engage in a joint roll-out of infrastructure that includes use of
frequencies, in so far as necessary for the provision of local services, in particular in rural areas.
The practice of ex ante intervention in contract formation continues in the coming period.
Infrastructure sharing can take very different forms, going as far as parties agreeing on joint
ownership of certain network elements that can serve to balance their needs, while also sharing
financial risks that will occur during the period of investment. In the event of a form of joint
ownership of infrastructure elements, this should affect the level playing field positively, as the
parties will truly share the risks of the innovative investments on an ex ante basis. Such arrange-
ment is likely to be agreed once the new frequencies have been allocated. This entails that the party
controlling the infrastructure will have to give up some of its first mover advantage for the benefit
of the party entering the sharing arrangement. There is not yet enough data available on the long-
term economic and legal advantages of these types of arrangements. They create competition law
concerns at a different level and most certainly raise a host of issues between the parties regarding
the division and exploitation of intellectual property rights in new products. Probably, it would be
best to see this form of cooperation more as a business and organization offer and deal with it as
such in the contract terms; this is likely to make the arrangements more workable and, perhaps also,
more sustainable. Conversely, it is likely that sharing arrangements could offer the parties more
flexibility and freedom in creating opportunities for both incremental and fundamental infrastruc-
ture investments. ECN operators who will prepare for their networks or infrastructure to be shared
31. Commission Recommendation (2013) and Council Directive (2014/61/EU).
32. TSM Proposal, Article 59, section 2, third paragraph.
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with others are likely to be the first to reap the benefits of these arrangements – hence the
‘wholesale only models’ contemplated by the Commission. If these arrangements include the use
of SDN, the parties cooperating could make a head start, it seems.
From a technology and infrastructure perspective, the variations between sharing arrangements
are substantial. Looking closer at infrastructure agreements, roughly speaking, we can distinguish
between (i) passive and (ii) active infrastructure sharing and (iii) spectrum sharing (BEREC, 2011;
Borba Lefèvre, 2008).33 The first example is passive sharing of infrastructure elements such as
masts, sites, cabinets, racks, power or conditioning; also known as site sharing, this is the lightest
(and from a competition law perspective least worrisome) form of cooperation. The party gaining
access to existing network elements of the other party is unlikely to get access to the competitive
facilities of that party. The second example includes active sharing of antennae, nodes, and,
possibly the RAN. This form of cooperation may include sharing of the backhaul that goes to the
different Radio Network Controls (RNCs). The implementation of SDN/NFV will make this
approach feasible and sustainable for competitors who wish to share. In fact, SDN could imply
that traditional hardware suppliers will come to the fore and be an important partner in such
arrangements. Hence this form of cooperation approach can vary even more than with passive
sharing, but it can also be expected to raise more concerns with (national) competition authorities.
These authorities are likely to require strong Chinese walls between the core network and the
shared elements. When SDN/NFV become a proven technology, many aspects – from infrastruc-
ture separation to security arrangements – will be easier to achieve. Hopefully, the space used by
such equipment and the connection with optical fibre networks can be achieved as well. It seems
plausible that these contracts will become smarter – not in the meaning of smart contracts in the
context of blockchain technology (although that might be a protocol that parties could explore).
No matter which type of infrastructure sharing is applied, the contract terms will be different.
They must be as future proof as possible. Simple clauses that acknowledge the possibly required
consequences of market regulation (as, e.g. a change of circumstances; a contract governance
issue; or, perhaps, force majeure) do not suffice. The very detailed and technological scope of the
arrangements between the various market players requires a different contractual approach and
contract management is more than ever key. Think about the varying specifications, infrastructure
separation; contracts with landlords; security arrangements, network continuity and services lev-
els; and much more. A disadvantage of sharing arrangements probably is that such an arrangement
may be difficult to disentangle, which could create uncertainty regarding future divergences and
the costs thereof between the cooperating parties (Commission Decision, 2004). This requires
thinking on smart clauses regulating termination, transition and transformation.
In a period of disruptive innovation, an ECN operator might have two choices (Baldwin et al.,
2012, pp. 493–496): (i) implementing a ‘tried and tested technology’ into its intelligent network
elements, with predictable outcome, about the cost of implementation, maintenance and the cor-
responding income it could generate; or (ii) implementing an untested technology, such as NFV,
which could yield a higher average but more variable return on income. Engaging in a joint roll-out
of infrastructure that includes use of frequencies requires careful weighing of the R&D elements.
When thinking of long-term agreements, arrangements could include the delivery of novel network
equipment to the other party; they could include specific new forms of access arrangements; a
33. The third example concerns competitors who are using a specific radio frequency band simultaneously. Since I am
concerned with infrastructure competition, I will not discuss this form of sharing.
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compensation by the party obtaining access to the ECN operator’s network to be able to offer
innovative services can be considered. These types of arrangements also include detailed provi-
sions on the access and interoperability levels. Presumably, these agreements contain less risk-
taking elements for the party seeking access, unless such party would commit itself to paying a
partial compensation related to future technological enhancements by the operator. Yet, it seems
somewhat difficult to envisage how such a party would justify such a financial commitment to its
shareholders. Again, competition law concerns abound, as well. The ECN operator may focus on
preservative maintenance, rather than on innovation. Hence, operators and service providers are
likely to focus on closely defined outsourcing projects. Whereas this is logical, and probably not
that problematic from the regulator’s perspective (risk aversion is not a bad thing), voluntary
outsourcing of activities aimed at innovation requires a reassessment of how the investments fit
in with incentive and cost-oriented regulation. Outsourcing parts of an infrastructure prove to be a
fake resolve for an ECN operator and it will still face the same dilemmas on investment risk. Any
sourcing agreement an ECN operator might enter with a supplier of innovative technology should
cater for flexibility regarding investment decisions. The operator should cater for a right to post-
pone investment decisions, until it can resolve certain future uncertainty regarding cost evolution
of its network (Arve & Zwart, 2014, p. 21). This possibility should perhaps not be limited to
making decisions on the cost side, but also on the revenue side.
What regulatory measures could be applied for these sharing and joint roll-out agreements?
Where not always there is a scope for game changers to duplicate the regulated operator’s net-
works, a regulatory measure might be to what Baldwin et al. refer to as ‘the contestability of
network investments’ (Baldwin et al., 2012, p. 470ff.). This approach could range from imposing
terms on the regulated operator to outsource – parts of – infrastructure developments to, say,
equipment suppliers; or enable game changers to introduce product improvements to innovation
and dynamic efficiencies on the operators’ networks. Both of which examples follow under the
sharing and sourcing agreements discussed above. The upside of contestability is that it can be
introduced in a wide range of formats (Baldwin et al., 2012). This could enhance technological
flexibility. But, as the authors observe correctly, the current tendency remains limited to partial and
voluntary outsourcing of certain network activities, ranging from maintenance and support, to
partial or full ownership of network elements, and a full range of various contracts may be used to
achieve the sourcing of these activities. This begs the question as to whether and how the Com-
mission could rather focus on using regulation to further stimulate services interoperability as an
alternative to price regulation or imposing regulatory measures on parties who are negotiating
complex infrastructure sharing or roll-out arrangements. As has been demonstrated in representa-
tive literature on regulation, risks and economic issues are often subject to networks of regulation
(Teubner, Collins, & Everson, 2011). Smart contracting to fend-off intervention is very much
alive.
Institutional aspects
Any discussion on the material aspects of telecommunications networks regulation triggers ques-
tions typical to the functioning of the EU. What role could the Commission, the NRAs in the
member states play and how this would support sustainable and effective regulation and contrac-
tual arrangements? Considering the current roles attributed to NRAs, one would expect a clear and
well researched set of tools to be made available for these entities to safeguard infrastructure
competition. Yet, the tasks assigned to NRAs appear to have been formulated at a very high level.
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There is no clear line or test for NRAs when it comes to stimulating innovation or supporting
discussions on new telecommunications networks agreements. More specifically, the Commission
is not very clear as to whether it is concerned with ECN operators perceiving certain forms of
regulation – think of cost-orientation obligations – as a barrier to investment, or – conversely –
whether it believes that the way forward is to proactively impose obligations to invest in networks.
The main regulatory governance variable is the regulatory commitment of and to the EU, or
rather, the apparent lack thereof. Catering for network reliability cannot solely be a task for
gatekeepers. Although no one will argue that the liberalization of electronic communications
should be undone, to put the onus for network reliability predominantly on the sitting ECN
operators probably misses the mark. Network reliability and security remain a government task
and a joint responsibility. Game changers, who do not operate their own networks, have an interest
in ensuring that data traffic is as hassle-free and as safe as possible.
The Commission should investigate better why and how governance and enforcement measures
it expects support innovation.34 The decision on the Commission’s competence in determining a
5G strategy is helpful.35 It should be investigated further in what manner the NRAs can act pro-
actively to stimulate technological innovation and whether there would be any meaningful role for
BEREC.36 BEREC envisages a stronger role for itself, bearing in mind that the current ecosystem
is based on a balance between the Commission (pursuing the vision of the single market), the
NRAs (individually), and BEREC acting collectively.37 But it is unclear whether there is consen-
sus on increasing BEREC’s powers at expense of the NRA’s. For the moment, flexibility and
openness in their governance models must be improved to enable the NRAs to better deal with the
developments on an increasingly dynamic playing field. Whether the NRAs will be willing to
intervene will, likely, be connected closely to the degree in which proactive, aggressive market
parties will request the NRAs to impose access or price measures on these parties’ competitors; and
more far-reaching, order them to enter into a passive or active infrastructure-sharing agreement.
Moreover, it is uncertain how BEREC overall coordination and advice will turn out, certainly
where it concerns contract formation conflicts.
Conclusion: Smarter telecommunications regulation and smarter
contracts
This article asked what type of regulation can be a suitable to further stimulate innovation. Having
looked at available regulatory tools, the shifting regulatory perspectives, possible side-effects, two
proposals for regulating network levels for services interoperability, subsidies, standardization and
self-regulation, the general feeling is that a fresh approach is required.
Given that the law simply never keeps up with the speed of technological change, more
flexibility is needed. Repealing outdated parts of the NRF is smart; conversely, the enhanced
application, re-interpretation and/or stricter enforcement of the new electronic communications
code requires further scrutiny. The imposition of renewed and directed regulatory instruments
makes sense. Although I believe that the dissenters – who propagate the inversion of the level
34. Impact Assessment, part 3/3, p. 383.




playing field by arguing for incentives for gatekeepers versus no right for game changers – may
overstate their case, it is in the interest of society at large that the long-term robustness of fixed and
mobile ECNs is safeguarded. That does not mean I propagate more regulation. I do believe in
having more regard for the proportionality of measures and the need for better governance. A form
of ‘intermediate’ regulation fits better at this juncture. In conclusion, I am not entirely convinced a
ranking of regulatory options can still be applied in the electronic communications markets that, on
the one hand, have become more competitive, and on the other hand, must face the immense
challenges arising from disruptive technologies and OTTs.
Where ECNs are configured better to support technological innovations, such as the use of IoT
and the digital transformation of different industries, this should be accompanied by, for example,
increased certainty regarding the regulation of market parties in the IoT value chain; the reduction
of heterogeneity in regulation in favour of start-ups; the improvement of connectivity for SIM-
based M2M services; the increase of confidence in information and network security as well as
privacy; a faster adoption of 5G and ubiquitous roll-out of very high-speed networks both directly
to the home and to street cabinets; this should also safeguard a sustainable backbone, which is
required for many IoT applications. There are many technical reports that underline that the 5G
roll-out must go together with investments in upgrades of the mobile network and fixed
infrastructure.
Yardstick regulation for network operators could well be in the books. However, it appears that
the Commission, considering the diverging aims and goals attached to technological innovation,
finds a solution in more delegation to the NRA, combined with a mix of measures and means is
likely to yield the best results for efficient intervention. Yet, the stimulation of access to very high-
speed broadband networks is a policy goal and not a means per se that NRAs can apply pro-
actively. Unfortunately, the Commission does not provide more clues than repeating its adage that
the NRAs must promote efficient competition – in this case infrastructure competition.38
By mixing the regulatory approaches, it is probably easier to achieve a balance between the
need for investments incentives, while maintaining the level playing field. It seems that both
gatekeepers and game changers would benefit from such a mixed and intermediate regulatory
approach. Continuing asymmetric regulation in converging fixed markets – especially cost-
oriented regulation at the wholesale level – does not appear to be in synch with the expected
network convergence following the distribution of 5G and the advent of SDN/NFV in the coming
years. These developments appear to justify a softer stance towards regulation of ECN-fixed
operators, that is, more incentive regulation and self-regulation, or a period of deregulation.
When done properly, a regulatory holiday can be equal to incentive regulation, which is usually
based on a mix of cost reduction and efficient pricing.
The Commission wanted the NRAs to reapply the well-known principles of openness, objec-
tiveness, transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality, while focusing on the stimulation
of efficient investments and innovations in new and improved infrastructure. This entails that
NRAs must see to it that any access obligation they consider imposing must consider the invest-
ment risks of the parties involved. Another point of view, in a situation of asymmetrical regulation,
would be to determine whether an SMP party shows a willingness to invest. If it does, it could face
less stringent access obligations. Conversely, an interested party looking to achieve that an NRA
imposes SMP obligations could find a willing ear where it would demonstrate the scope and depths
38. TSM Proposal (2016), Article 2 subsection (b).
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of innovative investments it made so far. Where the NRA is asked to judge the permissibility of a
form of cooperation ex post (a joint venture, or a horizontal technology agreement) it is required to
determine how various market parties could and should divide the risk of investments in infra-
structure, while safeguarding competition and having regard at the non-discrimination principle.
Hence, it appears that the NRAs partly must convert themselves from an ex ante supervisory
agency to an agency that will intervene in cooperation arrangements that have been notified to
it and that bear investment risks.
It is better to leave the translation of technological developments in contracts as much as
possible to the market parties. Too much guidance on contract terms could stifle competition. It
would be wise for the Commission to seriously study the effectiveness of the various bargaining
models in current and future, increasingly convergent markets. It could also research the differ-
ences between new legislation in terms of the effectiveness of the duty to bargain and imposed
entry requirements in the member states. Such knowledge might help prevent the fifth generation
of legislation from being up for another review in just a few years.
The proponents of smart regulation suggest a mix of both mandated government intervention
with various intervention means; and these could well be mixed with incentives, whether through
subsidies or tax laws. Incentive regulation could serve to stimulate a regulated ECN operator to
make more fundamental innovative investments in its network to solve bottlenecks in transmission
of data. As such, these operators could anticipate alternative investments by game changers in
complementary infrastructure, if they feel they can do this better, quicker and/or more (cost-)
effectively. Increased competition would lead to lower prices and increased demand of the ECNs.
Thus, the value of the network is safeguarded. Increased competition could stimulate competition
in terms of investment to solve bottlenecks, by both the gatekeepers and the game changers.
Finally, the interest of ECN operators to get clarity about the regulatory horizon is evident. They
need to know: is the sunset in sight, or should they expect continuity of ex ante intervention and
asymmetric regulation?
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